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  ABSTRACT	  Fertility	  research	  has	  traditionally	  assumed	  male	  fertility	  behavior	  was	  constant,	  overlooking	  the	  role	  of	  male	  economic	  factors,	  due	  largely	  to	  data	  restrictions.	  I	  use	  three	  models	  to	  analyze	  separate	  perspectives	  of	  data	  from	  the	  2011	  –	  2013	  Annual	  Social	  and	  Economic	  Supplement	  (ASEC)	  of	  the	  Current	  Population	  Survey	  (CPS)	  to	  determine	  whether	  male	  circumstances	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  fertility	  behavior.	  This	  paper	  shows	  that	  the	  assumption	  that	  male	  fertility	  behavior	  is	  constant	  is	  invalid.	  Just	  like	  women,	  men	  prefer	  childbearing	  at	  certain	  life	  stages	  and	  will	  delay	  to	  maximize	  their	  own	  utility.	  Student	  enrollment	  has	  a	  particularly	  strong	  affect	  on	  delayed	  fertility.	  As	  such,	  policy	  measures	  that	  help	  society	  adapt	  to	  qualification	  inflation	  and	  other	  issues	  are	  important	  for	  continued	  near-­‐replacement	  fertility	  in	  United	  States.
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  CHAPTER	  I	  INTRODUCTION	  	   	  Historically,	  fertility	  research	  was	  highly	  gender	  specific,	  focusing	  on	  female	  experience	  and	  variables	  while	  overlooking	  much	  of	  the	  male	  experience.	  There	  are	  a	  couple	  reasons	  for	  this.	  First,	  appropriate	  data	  with	  the	  necessary	  characteristics	  is	  difficult	  to	  find.	  Few	  sources	  include	  information	  about	  the	  mother,	  father,	  and	  offspring,	  especially	  when	  you	  seek	  to	  include	  divorce	  or	  non-­‐marital	  childbearing.	  However,	  the	  quality	  of	  data	  has	  been	  improving,	  and	  this	  paper	  analyzes	  one	  such	  source	  of	  recently	  improved	  data.	  Secondly,	  entry	  into	  parenthood	  continues	  to	  have	  more	  consequences	  for	  women	  than	  men.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  a	  generally	  accepted	  assertion	  that	  shifting	  fertility	  trends	  are	  caused	  by	  changes	  in	  female	  fertility	  behavior,	  with	  male	  fertility	  behavior	  assumed	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  constant	  (Lappegård,	  Rønsen,	  &	  Skrede,	  2011).	  This	  assertion	  is	  probably	  inappropriate	  as	  many	  societies	  elevate	  the	  importance	  of	  individual	  autonomy	  relative	  to	  childbearing.	  Increasingly,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  couples	  only	  have	  an	  additional	  child	  when	  both	  agree	  to	  it	  (Berrington,	  2004).	  For	  these	  reasons	  and	  others,	  male	  fertility	  behavior	  could	  exert	  currently	  a	  greater	  impact	  on	  overall	  fertility	  than	  theorized	  in	  the	  past.	  	  
	  	   2	  
Additionally,	  it	  is	  more	  common	  for	  the	  roles	  of	  men	  and	  women	  to	  overlap—especially	  in	  Western	  countries.	  As	  couples	  within	  a	  given	  society	  begin	  to	  adopt	  a	  dual-­‐earner/dual-­‐caregiver	  family	  model,	  more	  emphasis	  will	  be	  given	  to	  a	  man’s	  ability	  to	  care	  for	  children	  than	  before	  (Lappegård,	  Rønsen,	  &	  Skrede,	  2011).	  This	  change	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  relative	  “cost”	  of	  childbearing	  for	  men,	  possibly	  affecting	  a	  couple’s	  decision	  on	  when	  and	  how	  many	  children	  they	  will	  have.	  More	  importantly	  though,	  I	  theorize	  that	  male	  characteristics	  such	  as	  educational	  enrollment	  and/or	  attainment,	  unemployment,	  and	  others,	  are	  likely	  to	  delay	  female	  fertility	  regardless	  of	  the	  desire	  both	  may	  have	  for	  an	  additional	  child.	  This	  theory	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  results	  of	  a	  study	  conducted	  by	  Morgan	  and	  Rackin	  (2010),	  which	  suggest	  “that	  social	  norms	  and	  other	  constraints	  affecting	  the	  timing	  of	  parenthood	  weigh	  heavily	  on	  men	  as	  well	  as	  on	  women.”	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  social	  norms	  strongly	  pressure	  against	  childlessness	  and	  against	  large	  families	  often	  resulting	  in	  couples	  adopting	  the	  “two-­‐child	  norm”	  (Hayford,	  2009).	  In	  2004,	  a	  British	  study	  comparing	  partners’	  preferences	  for	  future	  fertility	  found	  “considerable	  consistency”	  in	  the	  responses	  between	  men	  and	  women	  who	  wanted	  up	  to	  two	  children;	  however	  beyond	  this	  point	  the	  data	  suggested	  that	  conflicting	  responses	  were	  likely	  (Berrington,	  2004).	  When	  these	  conflicts	  arose,	  men	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  want	  fewer	  children	  effectively	  pressuring	  partners	  who	  wanted	  larger	  families	  down	  to	  the	  two-­‐child	  norm.	  While	  this	  study	  was	  conducted	  in	  Great	  Britain,	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  norms	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  similar	  and	  would	  likely	  suggest	  a	  similar	  outcome.	  Assuming	  that	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  desire	  for	  either	  the	  quantity	  or	  timing	  of	  childbearing,	  couples	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may	  opt	  for	  the	  more	  conservative	  preference	  between	  the	  two	  (by	  not	  having	  a	  child),	  or	  may	  try	  to	  convince	  one	  another	  that	  an	  additional	  child	  is	  warranted.	  If	  they	  try	  to	  convince	  one	  another,	  their	  ability	  to	  do	  so	  may	  depend	  on	  bargaining	  power.	  A	  model	  by	  Klawon	  and	  Tiefenthaler	  (2001)	  asserts	  that	  men	  and	  women	  with	  different	  fertility	  preferences	  may	  use	  bargaining	  power	  within	  the	  household	  to	  convince	  one	  another	  to	  change	  their	  fertility	  preference.	  In	  their	  model,	  the	  recipient	  of	  nonwage	  income	  mattered	  and	  determined	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  that	  individual.	  This	  model	  contrasts	  with	  unitary	  models	  in	  which	  husbands	  and	  wives	  pool	  their	  income	  and	  act	  together	  to	  maximize	  a	  joint	  utility	  function	  (Klawon	  &	  Tiefenthaler,	  2001).	  Studying	  families	  in	  Brazil,	  Klawon	  and	  Tiefenthaler's	  results	  reject	  the	  assumption	  that	  households	  follow	  a	  unitary	  model.	  Certainly,	  there	  are	  cultural	  differences	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Brazil;	  however	  this	  paper	  clearly	  illustrates	  the	  potential	  for	  bargaining	  for	  fertility	  by	  couples.	  With	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  couples	  following	  the	  dual-­‐earner/dual-­‐caregiver	  family	  model,	  the	  potential	  for	  bargaining	  may	  increase	  because	  both	  parties	  experience	  explicit	  opportunity	  costs.	  In	  the	  United	  States	  there	  are	  also	  other	  major	  trends	  that	  affect	  fertility:	  the	  rise	  of	  cohabitation	  and	  non-­‐marital	  childbearing,	  changes	  in	  education	  and	  employment,	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  delayed	  childbearing.	  	  	  	   Cohabitation	  and	  Non-­‐Marital	  Childbearing	  The	  disassociation	  between	  marriage	  and	  childbearing	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  distinctive	  features	  of	  modern	  parenthood	  (Bailey,	  Guldi,	  &	  Hershbein,	  2013).	  It	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results	  from	  the	  considerable	  increases	  in	  cohabitation	  and	  non-­‐marital	  childbearing.	  Between	  the	  years	  1970	  to	  2009	  the	  percentage	  of	  live	  births	  to	  unmarried	  women	  (i.e.,	  single,	  divorced,	  separated,	  widowed)	  increased	  from	  11%	  to	  41%;	  about	  half	  of	  these	  births	  occurred	  within	  cohabitating	  unions	  (Martinez,	  Daniels,	  &	  Chandra,	  2012).	  Much	  of	  this	  increase	  is	  a	  recent	  development.	  In	  2002,	  only	  12%	  of	  first	  births	  occurred	  within	  cohabitating	  unions	  but	  in	  2006	  –	  2010	  this	  percentage	  increased	  to	  22%	  (Martinez	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Figure	  1	  shows	  the	  percentage	  of	  first	  birth	  by	  married,	  cohabiting,	  and	  neither	  married	  nor	  cohabitating	  for	  2002	  and	  2006	  –	  2010.	  Overall,	  about	  6%	  of	  all	  U.S.	  adults	  (ages	  15+)	  live	  in	  a	  cohabitating	  union	  with	  a	  different-­‐sex	  partner;	  this	  number	  is	  the	  highest	  (12%)	  among	  adults	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  20	  –	  29	  (Kennedy	  &	  Fitch,	  2012).	  And	  because	  	  
Figure	  1:	  Marital	  or	  cohabiting	  status	  at	  first	  birth	  for	  females	  and	  males	  aged	  15–44	  years	  (Martinez	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  
	  	   5	  
partners	  occasionally	  change,	  many	  children	  do	  not	  have	  a	  consistent	  pair	  of	  parents.	  About	  40%	  of	  all	  children	  in	  the	  United	  States	  live	  at	  some	  point	  in	  a	  cohabitating	  family	  during	  childhood	  (Kennedy	  &	  Bumpass,	  2008).	  Consequently,	  fertility	  research	  aimed	  at	  only	  married	  couples	  will	  overlook	  an	  increasingly	  large	  demographic	  from	  the	  analysis.	  	  	   The	  reasons	  behind	  this	  drastic	  change	  in	  fertility	  behavior	  are	  not	  completely	  understood	  by	  researchers.	  However,	  many	  attribute	  these	  changes	  to	  women’s	  empowerment	  that	  has	  continued	  since	  the	  contraceptive	  revolution	  and	  women’s	  rights	  movement	  that	  both	  began	  in	  the	  1960s	  (Christensen,	  2011;	  Hakim,	  2003;	  Romeu	  Gordo,	  2009).	  Advances	  in	  contraceptives	  offered	  heterosexual	  women	  independent	  control	  over	  their	  fertility	  without	  the	  necessary	  agreement	  or	  cooperation	  of	  male	  partners	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  history	  (Hakim,	  2003).	  The	  resulting	  economic	  and	  social	  changes	  from	  women’s	  empowerment	  gave	  women	  greater	  control	  over	  their	  own	  fertility,	  whom	  to	  mate	  with,	  or	  whether	  to	  mate	  at	  all	  (Aarssen,	  2005).	  As	  divorce	  rates	  have	  increased	  and	  women’s	  economic	  opportunities	  improved,	  single	  motherhood	  also	  became	  financially	  possible	  and	  more	  socially	  acceptable	  (Upchurch,	  Lillard,	  &	  Panis,	  2002).	  Given	  these	  factors,	  it	  is	  possible	  the	  relative	  benefit	  of	  marriage	  has	  decreased	  to	  the	  point	  at	  which	  we	  are	  now	  substituting	  non-­‐marital	  cohabitation	  for	  marriage	  under	  certain	  circumstances.	  Choosing	  a	  mate	  has	  also	  become	  a	  more	  selective	  process	  than	  before.	  Under	  the	  dual-­‐earner/dual-­‐caregiver	  family	  model,	  individuals	  are	  judged	  not	  only	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  earn	  money	  for	  the	  household,	  but	  also	  how	  willing	  they	  are	  to	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help	  clean	  the	  house	  and	  care	  for	  children.	  As	  such,	  there	  are	  no	  guarantees	  they	  will	  find	  a	  suitable	  marital	  partner.	  Women	  who	  cannot	  find	  a	  suitable	  mate	  may	  opt	  for	  non-­‐marital	  childbearing,	  rather	  than	  give	  up	  on	  both	  marriage	  and	  motherhood	  (Upchurch,	  Lillard,	  &	  Panis,	  2002).	  Data	  from	  2006	  –	  2010	  in	  the	  United	  States	  show	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	  first	  birth,	  24%	  of	  women	  were	  neither	  married	  nor	  cohabitating	  (Martinez	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  For	  many	  other	  women,	  finding	  a	  suitable	  partner	  remains	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  childbearing.	  Therefore,	  a	  possible	  explanation	  for	  the	  aggregate	  underachievement	  of	  intended	  fertility1	  in	  the	  United	  States	  could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  decline	  in	  marriage	  rates	  and/or	  an	  increase	  of	  marital	  disruption	  (Morgan	  &	  Rackin,	  2010).	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  complete	  picture	  of	  fertility,	  cohabitation	  and	  non-­‐marital	  childbearing	  become	  important	  considerations	  while	  undertaking	  research	  using	  United	  States	  data.	  	  	   Education	  and	  Employment	  	   Education	  and	  employment	  characteristics,	  and	  their	  role	  in	  fertility	  research,	  have	  changed	  significantly	  in	  recent	  decades.	  This	  is	  certainly	  true	  for	  women.	  For	  instance,	  women’s	  employment	  has	  continued	  to	  rise	  over	  the	  last	  half	  century	  in	  the	  United	  States	  until	  in	  June	  of	  2009,	  women	  made	  up	  an	  unprecedented	  50%	  of	  all	  nonfarm	  employment	  (Wood,	  2014).	  Figure	  2	  shows	  this	  change	  in	  the	  United	  States	  since	  1964.	  This	  was	  partially	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Intended	  fertility	  is	  the	  number	  of	  children	  parents	  plan	  to	  have	  over	  the	  lifetime	  of	  their	  reproductive	  years	  and	  may	  differ	  from	  actual	  completed	  fertility.	  	  For	  the	  1957	  –	  64	  US	  birth	  cohort	  Morgan	  and	  Rackin	  (2010)	  found	  a	  modest	  difference	  between	  intended	  and	  actual	  fertility:	  -­‐.25	  and	  -­‐.40	  fewer	  children	  than	  intended,	  for	  women	  and	  men	  respectively;	  however	  this	  modest	  difference	  was	  due	  largely	  to	  compensating	  errors	  in	  fertility	  since	  only	  about	  40%	  of	  the	  cohort	  exactly	  achieved	  their	  intentions.	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Great	  Recession	  disproportionally	  affected	  men	  (Wood,	  2014).	  Yet,	  this	  statistic	  is	  still	  important	  because	  women	  tend	  to	  consolidate	  their	  careers	  before	  motherhood	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  impact	  to	  their	  career	  (Romeu	  Gordo,	  2009).	  If	  men	  do	  this	  as	  well,	  then	  couples	  may	  wait	  until	  both	  have	  attained	  stability	  in	  their	  respective	  careers	  before	  having	  children.	  Women’s	  increased	  share	  of	  employment	  also	  illustrates	  the	  likely	  prevalence	  of	  the	  dual-­‐earner/dual-­‐caregiver	  family	  model	  in	  America.	  	  
	  Figure	  2:	  Employment	  of	  women	  and	  men,	  in	  thousands,	  and	  women’s	  share	  of	  employment,	  seasonally	  adjusted	  (Wood,	  2014)	  Furthermore,	  both	  women	  and	  men	  are	  going	  to	  school	  far	  longer	  in	  order	  to	  become	  competitive	  in	  the	  workplace.	  In	  the	  last	  decade	  alone,	  the	  percentage	  of	  women	  (ages	  25	  and	  older)	  holding	  a	  bachelor’s	  degree	  has	  increased	  by	  28.8%	  and	  for	  those	  holding	  an	  advanced	  degree	  it	  has	  increased	  by	  52.2%.	  Men’s	  (ages	  25	  and	  older)	  educational	  attainment	  has	  also	  increased	  by	  21.5%	  and	  28%	  respectively	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over	  the	  same	  period	  (U.S.	  Census	  Bureau,	  2013a).	  Figure	  3	  displays	  this	  information.	  More	  people	  are	  getting	  more	  education,	  and	  in	  this	  race	  women	  are	  leading	  the	  pack.	  Presently,	  women	  in	  the	  United	  States	  make	  up	  57%	  of	  all	  students	  in	  tertiary	  education	  (European	  Commission,	  Eurostat,	  2012).	  These	  changes	  are	  	  
	  Figure	  3:	  Percent	  change	  from	  2003	  to	  2013	  in	  the	  number	  of	  men	  and	  women	  25	  and	  over	  who	  have	  completed	  selected	  levels	  of	  education	  (U.S.	  Census	  Bureau,	  2013a)	  important	  because	  education	  and	  employment	  are	  widely	  recognized	  to	  impact	  fertility	  behaviors	  (Bratti,	  2003;	  Dreze	  &	  Murthi,	  2001;	  Keng	  &	  Sheu,	  2011;	  Klawon	  &	  Tiefenthaler,	  2001;	  Sabia	  &	  Rees,	  2009;	  Shang	  &	  Weinberg,	  2012).	  Extended	  educational	  enrollment	  has	  a	  particularly	  acute	  potential	  to	  impact	  fertility.	  This	  is	  partly	  because	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  schooling	  often	  postpones	  the	  transition	  to	  marriage	  and	  therefore	  affects	  fertility	  timing	  (Romeu	  Gordo,	  2009).	  There	  are	  also	  behavioral	  differences:	  women	  with	  more	  education	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  use	  contraception,	  have	  lower	  levels	  of	  unintended	  births,	  and	  have	  later	  and	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lower	  total	  fertility	  (Martinez	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  They	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  married,	  work,	  delay	  birth,	  and	  live	  in	  higher	  income	  households	  than	  women	  with	  lower	  relative	  education	  (Bailey,	  Guldi,	  &	  Hershbein,	  2013).	  A	  fairly	  recent	  accumulation	  of	  research	  shows	  that	  educational	  enrollment	  is	  a	  strong	  determinant	  of	  delayed	  fertility.	  For	  both	  men	  and	  women	  a	  close	  relationship	  exists	  between	  the	  duration	  of	  education	  and	  the	  delay	  in	  first	  birth	  (Dey	  &	  Wasoff,	  2010).	  In	  their	  paper,	  Ní	  Bhrolcháin	  and	  Beaujouan	  (2012)	  showed	  the	  rise	  of	  educational	  enrollment	  was	  a	  substantial	  contributor	  to	  postponed	  childbearing	  in	  Britain	  and	  France.	  Interestingly,	  the	  net	  effect	  of	  educational	  attainment	  was	  less	  clear	  when	  enrollment	  was	  present	  in	  the	  model.	  Studies	  in	  Germany	  have	  also	  found	  that	  a	  women’s	  fertility	  timing	  is	  determined	  more	  by	  their	  extended	  participation	  in	  schooling	  and	  less	  by	  their	  level	  of	  education	  (Romeu	  Gordo,	  2009).	  This	  makes	  sense	  since	  many	  students	  prefer	  to	  not	  have	  children	  while	  they	  attend	  school.	  In	  fact,	  men	  and	  women	  enrolled	  in	  school	  are	  often	  subject	  to	  environments	  that	  have	  strong	  norms	  against	  childbearing	  (Morgan,	  &	  Rackin,	  2010).	  However,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  field	  of	  study	  could	  impact	  these	  social	  norms.	  A	  study	  by	  Bavel	  (2010)	  indicated	  that	  fewer	  women	  postponed	  motherhood	  when	  they	  studied	  disciplines	  where	  stereotypical	  attitudes	  about	  family	  roles	  prevail	  and	  most	  of	  the	  graduates	  are	  female2.	  After	  graduation,	  there	  are	  various	  reasons	  why	  they	  may	  continue	  to	  postpone.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  In	  general,	  people	  trained	  to	  work	  in	  personal	  care	  services,	  or	  have	  a	  degree	  in	  engineering,	  natural	  sciences,	  or	  “other”	  degree	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  stronger	  stereotypical	  family	  attitudes	  than	  people	  trained	  to	  work	  in	  health	  care,	  legal	  services,	  education,	  or	  have	  a	  degree	  in	  arts	  and	  the	  humanities	  (Bavel,	  2010).	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While	  pursuing	  a	  career	  has	  become	  commonplace	  for	  women,	  a	  career	  also	  provides	  competition	  for	  childbearing	  activities.	  The	  general	  argument	  is	  that	  women	  are	  not	  having	  children	  at	  younger	  ages	  because	  career	  orientations	  and	  demands	  for	  costly	  childcare	  force	  them	  to	  delay	  the	  beginning	  of	  family	  formation	  (Martin,	  2000).	  Following	  this	  logic,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  childcare	  services	  would	  reduce	  women’s	  opportunity	  cost	  for	  having	  children	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  shift	  some	  of	  the	  burden	  to	  the	  market	  (Shang	  &	  Weinberg,	  2012).	  However,	  this	  argument	  is	  not	  always	  consistent	  with	  the	  empirical	  findings.	  After	  graduation,	  a	  higher	  starting	  wage	  and	  accelerated	  earnings	  both	  increased	  postponement	  of	  childbearing	  (Romeu	  Gordo,	  2009;	  Bavel,	  2010).	  	  It	  is	  quite	  believable	  that	  highly	  educated	  women	  find	  their	  work	  more	  fulfilling	  than	  women	  with	  less	  education	  and	  so	  they	  rely	  less	  on	  children	  for	  their	  identity	  (Hayford,	  2009).	  For	  instance,	  a	  highly	  educated	  woman	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  work	  in	  a	  male-­‐dominated	  career	  where	  they	  may	  put	  in	  long	  hours	  and	  suffer	  from	  a	  difficult	  working	  environment.	  Yet	  this	  same	  career	  also	  may	  provide	  them	  with	  self-­‐fulfillment,	  a	  generous	  income,	  status,	  prestige,	  and	  other	  benefits	  they	  highly	  value	  (Morgan	  &	  Rackin,	  2010).	  This	  could	  explain	  why	  many	  women	  devoted	  to	  their	  career	  choose	  not	  to	  have	  children.	  	  The	  existence	  of	  competing	  activities,	  such	  as	  a	  demanding	  career,	  generally	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  between	  voluntary	  and	  involuntary	  childlessness	  (Berrington,	  2004).	  That	  being	  said,	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  career	  and	  education	  often	  serve	  to	  delay	  childbearing	  rather	  than	  to	  cause	  childlessness.	  	   Delayed	  Fertility	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   Demographers	  consider	  postponed	  motherhood	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  key	  determinants	  of	  reduced	  fertility	  (Romeu	  Gordo,	  2009).	  While	  there	  may	  be	  some	  compensation	  associated	  with	  delayed	  fertility	  (Martin,	  2000;	  Shang	  &	  Weinberg,	  2012),	  there	  is	  a	  body	  of	  evidence	  that	  suggests	  the	  longer	  women	  delay	  the	  less	  likely	  they	  are	  to	  realize	  their	  ideal	  family	  size.	  Morgan	  and	  Rackin	  (2010)	  found	  that	  both	  women	  and	  men	  who	  delay	  childbearing	  or	  marriage	  did	  not	  have	  as	  many	  children	  as	  they	  expected.	  Dey	  and	  Wasoff	  (2010)	  showed	  that	  those	  who	  delay	  their	  first	  birth	  until	  their	  late	  20s	  to	  early	  30s	  have	  difficulty	  meeting	  their	  fertility	  aspirations.	  And	  in	  a	  British	  cohort	  study,	  Berrington	  (2004)	  found	  that	  during	  a	  six-­‐year	  period,	  only	  50	  percent	  of	  women	  who	  intended	  an	  additional	  birth	  actually	  had	  one.	  This	  compares	  with	  only	  11	  percent	  who	  unintentionally	  had	  an	  additional	  child.	  This	  research	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  women	  delay	  birth	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  From	  1970	  to	  2012,	  the	  average	  age	  at	  first	  birth	  has	  increased	  from	  21.4	  to	  25.8	  years	  old	  (Mathews	  &	  Hamilton,	  2009;	  U.S.	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  Figure	  4:	  Average	  age	  of	  mother	  at	  first	  birth:	  United	  States,	  1970	  –	  2006	  (CDC,	  2012)	  Dept.	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services,	  Center	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention	  [CDC],	  2012).	  Figure	  4	  illuminates	  this	  trend.	  The	  time	  for	  parenthood	  is	  never	  quite	  right	  for	  many	  couples	  and	  so	  they	  repeatedly	  postpone	  childbearing	  until	  their	  circumstances	  stabilize.	  People	  wait	  to	  get	  married,	  move	  out	  of	  their	  parent’s	  residence,	  or	  until	  they	  finally	  get	  that	  good	  job	  (Lutz	  &	  Skirbekk,	  2005).	  Beyond	  the	  women’s	  situation,	  men’s	  circumstances	  could	  contribute	  to	  these	  delays.	  Clearly	  though,	  the	  longer	  women	  delay	  birth,	  the	  shorter	  their	  window	  to	  have	  children	  becomes.	  	  Fecundity	  drops	  as	  we	  age.	  A	  fairly	  small	  population	  of	  women	  and	  men	  cannot	  have	  children	  even	  at	  young	  ages,	  and	  this	  proportion	  continues	  to	  increase	  	  as	  disease	  and	  age-­‐related	  declines	  in	  fecundity	  accumulate	  (Schmidt,	  2008).	  In	  fact,	  modeling	  work	  by	  Leridon	  (2004)	  has	  shown	  that	  even	  with	  artificial	  reproductive	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technologies,	  if	  all	  women	  start	  to	  conceive	  at	  age	  35,	  14%	  will	  remain	  childless	  and	  at	  age	  40	  this	  number	  rises	  to	  36%.	  Therefore	  the	  total	  number	  of	  children	  may	  be	  reduced	  in	  large	  part	  due	  to	  biological	  restrictions	  (Romeu	  Gordo,	  2009).	  Furthermore,	  postponement	  may	  cause	  women	  to	  underestimate	  age-­‐related	  fecundity	  declines	  as	  well	  as	  normative	  and	  structural	  difficulties	  for	  childbearing	  at	  advanced	  ages	  (Morgan	  &	  Rackin,	  2010).	  So	  if	  women	  want	  to	  have	  children	  at	  later	  ages	  due	  to	  educational	  and	  career	  goals,	  they	  will	  incur	  additional	  risk,	  making	  childbearing	  less	  likely	  or	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  children	  possible.	  Schmidt	  (2008)	  found	  that	  high-­‐risk	  tolerant	  women	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  delay	  both	  childbirth	  and	  marriage	  and	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  become	  mothers.	  In	  this	  study,	  a	  woman	  was	  risk	  tolerant	  if	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  give	  up	  their	  current	  job	  for	  a	  50/50	  chance	  at	  either	  a	  job	  that	  pays	  double	  or	  only	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  their	  current	  annual	  pay.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  women	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  delay	  in	  developed	  countries	  where	  social	  norms	  encourage,	  and	  reward,	  individual	  careers	  and	  educational	  attainment	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  having	  children	  at	  an	  earlier	  age.	  And	  since	  more	  women	  now	  participate	  in	  the	  labor	  force,	  unmet	  fertility	  aspirations	  are	  less	  associated	  with	  the	  availability	  of	  resources	  and	  more	  with	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  childbearing	  (Dey	  &	  Wasoff,	  2010).	  The	  opportunity	  cost	  against	  having	  children	  is	  higher	  and	  therefore	  more	  people	  are	  willing	  to	  tolerate	  higher	  risk	  for	  the	  benefits	  of	  employment.	  	  In	  the	  aggregate,	  delaying	  fertility	  also	  effects	  how	  we	  measure	  fertility.	  This	  is	  because,	  without	  adjustment,	  measures	  of	  fertility	  gauge	  two	  separate	  aspects	  of	  fertility:	  the	  quantum	  and	  tempo	  effects	  (Bongaarts	  &	  Feeney,	  1998).	  The	  quantum	  component	  measures	  actual	  changes	  in	  the	  number	  of	  children	  born	  to	  women.	  On	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the	  other	  hand,	  the	  tempo	  component	  measures	  the	  gaps	  between	  each	  generation;	  these	  gaps	  widen	  as	  delays	  to	  childbearing	  increase.	  These	  two	  components	  play	  off	  one	  another	  making	  accurate	  fertility	  forecasts	  difficult.	  This	  is	  because	  an	  entire	  year’s	  worth	  of	  births	  are	  lost/gained	  for	  every	  one-­‐year	  rise/decline	  in	  the	  timing	  of	  childbearing	  (Bongaarts,	  2002).	  Also,	  demographers	  have	  not	  always	  understood	  how	  the	  tempo	  component	  distorts	  fertility.	  Past	  concern	  over	  below-­‐replacement	  fertility	  in	  the	  United	  States	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  was	  largely	  misplaced	  for	  this	  reason	  (Bongaarts	  &	  Feeney,	  1998).	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  should	  ignore	  the	  tempo	  component	  of	  fertility	  measurement.	  Deferring	  childbearing	  leaves	  a	  shorter	  period	  to	  complete	  subsequent	  births,	  and	  so	  many	  women	  may	  have	  fewer	  children	  than	  they	  desire	  the	  longer	  they	  wait.	  This	  consequence	  is	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  demographic	  literature	  as	  the	  tempo-­‐quantum	  interaction	  (Berrington,	  2004).	  Because	  of	  this,	  delayed	  fertility	  is	  interestingly	  also	  a	  cause	  for	  decreased	  fertility.	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  CHAPTER	  II	  METHOD	  	  My	  analysis	  attempts	  to	  incorporate	  the	  major	  trends	  affecting	  fertility	  in	  the	  United	  States	  while	  using	  the	  general	  fertility	  theory	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter	  to	  determine	  whether	  male	  circumstances	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  fertility	  behavior.	  I	  also	  contribute	  to	  existing	  theories	  of	  female	  fertility	  behavior	  by	  applying	  them	  in	  concert	  with	  male	  fertility	  behavior.	  To	  test	  whether	  male	  circumstances	  affect	  fertility	  behavior,	  I	  use	  three	  different	  models	  to	  capture	  alternative	  features	  of	  the	  data.	  The	  models	  use	  the	  probit	  regression	  followed	  by	  a	  marginal	  effects	  post-­‐estimation	  to	  analyze	  the	  period	  fertility	  behavior.	  The	  binary	  dependent	  variable,	  recent	  birth,	  represents	  a	  completed	  birth	  in	  the	  last	  12	  months.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  birth	  is	  considered	  completed	  if	  the	  pregnancy	  resulted	  in	  a	  live	  birth	  and	  the	  child	  survived	  until	  the	  time	  of	  the	  survey.	  As	  such,	  pregnancies	  ending	  due	  to	  miscarriage,	  stillbirth,	  or	  abortion	  are	  excluded.	  If	  a	  responsible	  parent	  has	  a	  birth	  in	  the	  last	  12	  months	  of	  the	  survey,	  the	  value	  is	  1	  (yes);	  otherwise	  it	  is	  0	  (no).	  A	  responsible	  parent	  is	  defined	  as	  an	  individual	  who	  takes	  responsibility	  for,	  and	  therefore	  desires,	  the	  child.	  This	  will	  not	  always	  be	  the	  biological	  parent;	  however	  the	  likelihood	  is	  great	  that	  in	  the	  last	  12	  months,	  the	  responsible	  parent	  is	  also	  the	  biological	  parent.	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The	  first	  model	  includes	  women	  and	  data	  about	  their	  male	  partners:	  married	  or	  otherwise.	  The	  observations	  for	  the	  first	  model	  are	  selected	  from	  women	  in	  their	  reproductive	  years	  (ages	  15	  to	  44	  years).	  To	  include	  male	  data,	  I	  created	  new	  female	  variables	  with	  data	  copied	  from	  their	  male	  partner.	  Consequently,	  single	  males	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  first	  model.	  The	  second	  model	  includes	  just	  women,	  and	  contains	  the	  same	  observations	  as	  the	  first	  model.	  Traditional	  fertility	  research	  is	  most	  similar	  to	  the	  second	  model.	  The	  third	  model	  includes	  just	  men,	  and	  observations	  are	  selected	  from	  men	  in	  their	  reproductive	  years	  (ages	  15	  to	  44	  years3).	  The	  third	  model	  includes	  single	  men	  whereas	  the	  first	  two	  models	  do	  not.	  For	  all	  three	  models,	  men	  and	  women	  each	  have	  the	  same	  set	  of	  independent	  variables.	  Age	  is	  included	  in	  this	  set	  and	  serves	  to	  reduce	  age	  bias	  in	  the	  models.	  After	  all,	  fertility	  and	  fecundity	  decline	  as	  we	  age.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  set	  of	  general	  variables,	  which	  apply	  to	  both	  members	  of	  the	  household.	  All	  variables	  are	  chosen	  based	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  data	  and	  on	  fertility	  theory.	  Using	  these	  three	  models,	  I	  can	  analyze	  fertility	  from	  multiple	  perspectives	  using	  the	  same	  dataset	  and	  hopefully	  gain	  otherwise	  hidden	  insight.	  	   Fertility	  Theory	  The	  general	  economic	  theory	  of	  fertility	  assumes	  that	  the	  demand	  for	  children	  is	  based	  on	  family	  preferences	  for	  a	  particular	  number	  of	  surviving	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 In their paper on fertility intentions and behavior, Morgan and Rackin (2010) found smaller and fewer 
differences by sex than hypothesized, “suggesting that social norms and other constraints affecting the 
timing of parenthood weigh heavily on men as well as on women and thus may largely negate the fact that 
men are biologically capable of fathering children much later in life.” 	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(relevant	  for	  regions	  with	  high	  mortality)	  children,	  by	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  (traditionally)	  the	  mother’s	  time,	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  caring	  for	  the	  children	  to	  maturity	  (Todaro	  &	  Smith,	  2011,	  p.	  288).	  As	  such,	  the	  demand-­‐side	  of	  fertility	  theory	  includes	  changes	  to	  preferences	  (cultural	  forces),	  family	  formation	  (structural	  forces),	  and	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  (economic	  forces)	  of	  childbearing.	  Alternatively,	  the	  supply-­‐side	  of	  childbearing	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  cost	  and	  availability	  of	  various	  contraceptive	  devices	  (Bailey,	  Guldi,	  &	  Hershbein,	  2013).	  Unfortunately	  there	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  distinction	  between	  the	  demand	  and	  supply	  sides	  of	  fertility	  since	  they	  often	  affect	  one	  another.	  While	  more	  income	  (economic	  forces)	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  afford	  children	  and	  childcare,	  more	  income	  also	  makes	  contraceptives	  more	  affordable.	  Popular	  use	  of	  contraceptives	  change	  culture	  and	  increases	  the	  occurrence	  of	  cohabitation	  (structural	  forces)	  (Christensen,	  2011).	  Moreover,	  the	  supply	  side	  may	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  just	  contraceptives	  but	  could	  also	  include	  other	  aspects	  that	  affect	  fertility.	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  advancements	  in	  artificial	  reproductive	  technologies	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  healthcare	  in	  developed	  countries	  also	  affect	  the	  supply-­‐side	  of	  childbearing.	  Artificial	  reproductive	  technologies	  allow	  many	  women	  to	  have	  children	  whom	  would	  otherwise	  remain	  childless,	  and	  healthcare	  redistributes	  the	  escalating	  cost	  of	  childbearing.	  A	  study	  conducted	  by	  Truven	  Health	  Analytics	  (2013)	  found	  that	  in	  the	  United	  States	  the	  “average	  total	  Commercial	  insurer	  payments	  for	  all	  maternal	  and	  newborn	  care	  with	  vaginal	  and	  cesarean	  childbirths	  were	  $18,329	  and	  $27,866,	  respectively.”	  Compare	  this	  with	  the	  $300	  to	  $950	  for	  an	  abortion	  in	  the	  first	  trimester	  (Planned	  Parenthood,	  2014)	  and	  a	  couple	  without	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insurance	  could	  be	  forced	  to	  have	  an	  abortion	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  heavy	  debt.	  These	  issues	  could	  have	  potentially	  large	  impacts	  on	  fertility.	  A	  notable	  theory	  only	  alluded	  to	  before	  this	  point	  states	  that	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  female	  labor	  participation	  rate	  corresponds	  with	  a	  decrease	  in	  fertility	  (Martin,	  2000;	  Maxwell,	  1998).	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  when	  women	  work,	  their	  opportunity	  costs	  rise	  and	  they	  trade-­‐off	  having	  children	  in	  favor	  of	  less	  time-­‐consuming	  activities.	  But	  while	  this	  theory	  may	  account	  for	  the	  general	  reduction	  in	  fertility	  rates,	  it	  cannot	  explain	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  traditionally	  negative	  correlation	  between	  fertility	  and	  female	  labor	  participation	  rates	  (Adserà,	  2003).	  In	  fact,	  the	  baby	  boom	  occurred	  during	  an	  environment	  of	  increasing	  income,	  urbanization,	  educational	  attainment,	  and	  women’s	  labor	  force	  participation—all	  of	  which	  are	  associated	  with	  declining	  fertility	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  (Bailey,	  Guldi,	  &	  Hershbein,	  2013).	  If	  women	  are	  especially	  committed	  to	  the	  workforce,	  then	  this	  theory	  may	  not	  ring	  true.	  Depending	  on	  social	  norms,	  women	  may	  feel	  more	  actualization	  from	  working	  than	  childbearing.	  A	  study	  conducted	  in	  Russia,	  where	  women	  are	  expected	  by	  society	  to	  work,	  found	  little	  empirical	  support	  of	  policies	  aimed	  at	  stimulating	  fertility	  by	  reducing	  employment	  (Maxwell,	  1998).	  Actually,	  as	  societies	  adopt	  a	  more	  dual-­‐earner/dual-­‐caregiver	  family	  structure,	  childcare	  may	  be	  the	  key	  to	  improving	  fertility.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  women	  who	  want	  to	  work	  and	  have	  children	  can	  do	  so	  largely	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  increased	  availability	  of	  childcare	  (Martin,	  2000).	  Likewise,	  the	  affordability	  of	  childcare	  is	  in	  part	  dependent	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  resources	  and	  the	  status	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  
	  	   19	  
The	  relationship	  between	  the	  availability	  of	  resources	  and	  fertility	  is	  complicated	  at	  best.	  One	  might	  expect	  that	  people	  with	  more	  resources	  to	  care	  for	  children	  would	  have	  more	  children.	  After	  all,	  parents	  with	  more	  disposable	  income	  should	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  to	  put	  more	  children	  in	  childcare.	  Paradoxically,	  parents	  with	  the	  most	  resources	  and	  most	  favorable	  circumstances	  are	  least	  likely	  to	  expect	  more	  children	  (Dey	  &	  Wasoff,	  2010).	  This	  could	  result	  from	  the	  higher	  opportunity	  cost	  children	  pose	  to	  parents	  with	  more	  resources.	  Another	  explanation	  for	  the	  paradoxical	  relationship	  follows	  that	  declining	  fertility	  results	  from	  increasing	  wealth	  because	  parents	  trade-­‐off	  between	  quantity	  and	  quality	  (Klawon	  &	  Tiefenthaler,	  2001).	  This	  occurs	  when	  parents	  invest	  more	  into	  each	  child	  knowing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  good	  chance	  of	  the	  child	  surviving	  into	  adulthood.	  Therefore,	  parents	  with	  more	  disposable	  income	  may	  opt	  for	  higher	  quality	  childcare	  rather	  than	  put	  more	  children	  into	  childcare.	  That	  being	  said,	  this	  does	  not	  always	  mean	  that	  there	  is	  a	  negative	  correlation	  between	  resources	  and	  fertility.	  The	  relationship	  could	  just	  exist	  on	  a	  different	  scale.	  Both	  unemployment	  and	  economic	  growth	  rates	  were	  found	  to	  be	  good	  predictors	  of	  the	  fertility	  rate,	  whether	  taken	  separately	  or	  together;	  prosperous	  economic	  conditions	  provide	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  for	  improved	  fertility	  (Goldstein,	  Sobotka,	  &	  Jasilioniene,	  2009).	  Therefore	  an	  increase	  on	  a	  macro-­‐economic	  scale	  in	  the	  availability	  of	  resources	  may	  increase	  the	  fertility	  rate	  where	  increases	  on	  the	  micro-­‐economic	  scale	  do	  not.	  	  	   Data	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   The	  data	  for	  this	  study	  are	  from	  the	  2011	  –	  2013	  Annual	  Social	  and	  Economic	  Supplement	  (ASEC)	  of	  the	  Current	  Population	  Survey	  (CPS)	  provided	  by	  the	  Integrated	  Public	  Use	  Microdata	  Series	  (IPUMS)	  at	  http://cps.ipums.org	  (King	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  For	  over	  50	  years,	  the	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau	  and	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Labor	  Statistics	  have	  jointly	  conducted	  the	  CPS	  every	  month	  in	  order	  to	  gather	  statistics	  on	  employment	  and	  unemployment.	  The	  survey	  interviews	  monthly	  around	  54,000	  households	  scientifically	  selected	  to	  give	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  nation,	  individual	  states,	  and	  other	  specified	  areas	  (U.S.	  Census	  Bureau,	  2013b).	  The	  ASEC	  supplement	  of	  the	  CPS	  is	  conducted	  every	  March	  and	  provides	  labor	  force	  data	  in	  addition	  to	  supplemental	  data	  on	  income,	  work	  experience,	  employment	  status,	  and	  health	  insurance.	  The	  CPS	  also	  includes	  extensive	  demographic	  data	  and	  is	  the	  largest	  monthly	  dataset	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  its	  kind.	  	  While	  a	  potentially	  rich	  source	  of	  data,	  there	  are	  various	  limitations	  to	  ASEC	  data	  for	  fertility	  research.	  First,	  because	  this	  is	  household	  data,	  it	  does	  not	  include	  anyone	  not	  living	  in	  the	  household.	  Consequently,	  fathers	  who	  do	  not	  live	  with	  their	  children	  appear	  childless.	  Also,	  only	  in	  very	  rare	  instances	  will	  a	  single	  man	  care	  for	  a	  newborn,	  since	  newborns	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  stay	  with	  the	  mother.	  Second,	  there	  is	  up	  to	  a	  year	  time-­‐gap	  between	  the	  earliest	  recent	  birth	  observation	  and	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interview.	  Therefore,	  some	  students	  who	  were	  in	  school	  at	  the	  time	  of	  childbirth	  may	  have	  dropped	  out	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  family.	  The	  exceptions	  to	  this	  brief	  time-­‐gap	  are	  the	  employment	  status,	  personal	  income,	  and	  household	  income:	  for	  these,	  interviewees	  were	  asked	  about	  the	  previous	  calendar	  year.	  Third,	  CPS	  data	  is	  designed	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  labor	  force	  statistics	  in	  the	  United	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States,	  and	  so	  it	  does	  not	  include	  detailed	  questions	  about	  fertility	  (e.g.,	  childbearing	  expectations	  and	  preferences,	  contraceptive	  use,	  etc.).	  Hence,	  fertility	  preferences	  (cultural	  forces)	  is	  the	  demand-­‐side	  element	  of	  fertility	  not	  represented	  in	  the	  models.	  I	  can	  only	  infer	  these	  preferences	  after	  looking	  at	  the	  results.	  Thankfully,	  there	  are	  significant	  benefits	  to	  using	  the	  ASEC	  data	  for	  fertility	  research.	  First,	  the	  incredibly	  large	  dataset	  allows	  me	  to	  analyze	  fertility	  without	  selecting	  specific	  segments	  of	  the	  population.	  Everyone	  in	  reproductive	  ages	  15	  –	  44	  years	  of	  age4	  are	  included	  in	  the	  sample.	  For	  this	  reason,	  my	  analysis	  can	  include	  married,	  single,	  and	  cohabitation	  family	  structures:	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  have	  had	  a	  recent	  birth	  (birth	  in	  the	  last	  12	  months).	  I	  could	  only	  accomplish	  this	  with	  a	  large	  dataset	  since	  the	  fertility	  rate	  is	  only	  63	  births	  per	  1000	  women	  aged	  15	  –	  44	  years	  (CDC,	  2012).	  Additionally,	  a	  large	  dataset	  is	  required	  to	  overcome	  any	  noise	  created	  by	  unintended	  births.	  According	  to	  Mosher,	  Jones,	  and	  Abma	  (2012),	  about	  37%	  of	  births	  are	  unintended,	  23%	  of	  which	  were	  mistimed	  and	  14%	  of	  which	  were	  unwanted.	  This	  being	  said,	  the	  analysis	  will	  find	  patterns	  in	  the	  data	  regardless	  of	  intention.	  The	  large	  dataset	  also	  allows	  for	  studying	  more	  unconventional	  characteristics	  that	  might	  be	  present	  only	  in	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  the	  63	  births	  per	  1000	  women.	  Second,	  the	  ASEC	  data	  contains	  a	  variety	  of	  variables	  both	  commonly	  and	  uncommonly	  associated	  with	  fertility	  research.	  The	  combination	  of	  these	  variables	  could	  lead	  to	  surprising	  results	  and	  possibly	  uncover	  a	  hidden	  side	  of	  fertility.	  Third,	  this	  dataset	  is	  representative	  of	  the	  U.S.	  population.	  Selection	  bias	  is	  minimized	  to	  every	  extent	  possible	  during	  the	  data	  collection	  process.	  	  Bias	  is	  also	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In	  2008,	  only	  about	  7,500	  women	  gave	  birth	  at	  age	  45	  and	  over	  comprising	  0.2%	  of	  all	  births	  (Martinez	  et	  al.,	  2012).	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mitigated	  using	  weighting	  variables	  to	  even	  out	  characteristics	  that	  may	  over-­‐	  or	  underrepresent	  the	  true	  national	  demographic.	  Using	  Stata	  (StataCorp,	  2011)	  survey	  procedures,	  I	  utilized	  the	  ASEC	  supplement	  person-­‐level	  weight	  variable	  and	  replicate	  weights	  to	  adjust	  for	  clustering	  and	  stratification	  and	  to	  calculate	  variances.	  This	  dataset	  affords	  a	  great	  chance	  to	  study	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  childbearing	  (economic	  forces).	  It	  has	  very	  detailed	  information	  on	  total	  personal	  income,	  household	  income,	  student	  status,	  educational	  attainment,	  employment	  status,	  etc.	  All	  of	  which	  have	  the	  potential	  as	  great	  variables	  for	  fertility	  research.	  I	  included	  both	  total	  personal	  income	  and	  household	  income	  for	  the	  previous	  calendar	  year.	  To	  prevent	  multicollinearity,	  personal	  income	  was	  subtracted	  from	  household	  income	  for	  each	  model.	  Consequently	  in	  the	  first	  model,	  household	  income	  represents	  the	  total	  household	  income	  minus	  the	  total	  personal	  income	  of	  the	  couple.	  Women’s	  personal	  income	  is	  excluded	  from	  household	  income	  for	  model	  2	  and	  men’s	  income	  is	  excluded	  in	  model	  3.	  Additionally,	  I	  included	  an	  interaction	  variable	  between	  total	  personal	  income	  and	  employment	  status.	  This	  variable	  essentially	  accounts	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  income	  is	  largely	  dependent	  on	  the	  employment	  status	  of	  the	  individual.	  This	  variable	  considers	  this	  dependent	  relationship	  behind	  the	  scenes	  and	  is	  not	  reported	  in	  the	  final	  post-­‐estimation	  results.	  I	  also	  incorporated	  whether	  they	  had	  any	  additional	  children	  in	  the	  models.	  Theoretically,	  the	  marginal	  opportunity	  cost	  increases	  for	  each	  child,	  otherwise	  families	  would	  continue	  to	  have	  children	  until	  their	  reproductive	  capabilities	  cease.	  Home	  ownership	  and	  public	  housing	  were	  also	  interesting	  variables.	  Public	  housing	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is	  housing	  sponsored	  by	  the	  government	  for	  low-­‐income	  families.	  Therefore,	  public	  housing	  is	  a	  proxy	  variable	  for	  welfare	  and/or	  poverty.	  By	  including	  this	  variable,	  a	  different	  relationship	  between	  household	  income	  and	  fertility	  could	  emerge.	  Home	  ownership	  is	  effectively	  the	  opposite	  of	  public	  housing.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  variable	  for	  people	  living	  with	  their	  parents.	  Dubbed	  by	  popular	  culture	  in	  America	  as	  the	  “failure	  to	  launch	  syndrome”,	  people	  are	  living	  with	  their	  parents	  well	  into	  adulthood,	  which	  could	  impact	  their	  desire	  for	  children5.	  	  The	  ASEC	  is	  also	  particularly	  well	  suited	  to	  analyze	  the	  family	  formation	  (structural	  forces)	  element	  of	  demand-­‐side	  fertility.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  a	  recent	  change	  that	  has	  greatly	  improved	  the	  reporting	  of	  cohabitation.	  In	  2007,	  the	  CPS	  started	  identifying	  all	  cohabiting	  partners	  in	  a	  household,	  and	  links	  children	  to	  their	  biological,	  step-­‐,	  and	  adoptive	  parents	  within	  the	  household	  (Kennedy	  &	  Fitch,	  2012).	  Now,	  all	  cohabiting	  partners	  are	  identified	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  describe	  themselves	  as	  “unmarried	  partners”	  to	  the	  householder6.	  This	  improvement	  is	  especially	  important	  since	  over	  40%	  of	  all	  births	  in	  2011	  were	  to	  unmarried	  women	  (Bailey,	  Guldi,	  &	  Hershbein,	  2013).	  The	  improvement	  is	  significant	  too.	  The	  old	  method	  missed	  18%	  of	  all	  cohabiting	  unions	  and	  12%	  of	  children	  living	  with	  cohabitating	  parents	  (Kennedy	  &	  Fitch,	  2012).	  I	  include	  both	  married	  and	  cohabitating	  as	  variables	  in	  all	  three	  models	  to	  distinguish	  any	  structural	  forces	  that	  may	  affect	  fertility.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  According	  to	  the	  Pew	  Research	  Center	  (Wang	  &	  Morin,	  2010),	  10%	  of	  18	  –	  34	  year	  olds	  said	  that	  they	  moved	  back	  in	  with	  their	  parents	  because	  of	  the	  Great	  Recession;	  14%	  of	  18	  –	  34	  year	  olds	  said	  that	  they	  postponed	  having	  a	  baby	  because	  of	  the	  Great	  Recession.	  6	  In	  previous	  years,	  individuals	  with	  relationship	  labels	  such	  as	  boyfriend/girlfriend	  or	  fiancée	  might	  not	  consider	  themselves	  “unmarried	  partners”.	  Therefore,	  the	  survey	  data	  would	  not	  capture	  the	  relationship	  of	  these	  individuals.	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For	  the	  supply-­‐side	  of	  fertility,	  my	  options	  were	  more	  limited.	  The	  CPS	  does	  not	  include	  information	  on	  contraceptive	  use.	  As	  I	  argued	  before,	  the	  presence	  of	  healthcare	  affects	  the	  supply-­‐side	  of	  fertility,	  and	  the	  CPS	  does	  contain	  healthcare	  information.	  As	  such	  I	  included	  a	  binary	  variable	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  member	  has	  any	  health	  coverage.	  However,	  chances	  are	  good	  that	  if	  one	  member	  in	  a	  relationship	  has	  healthcare	  so	  does	  the	  other.	  For	  this	  reason,	  in	  the	  first	  and	  second	  model	  the	  healthcare	  variable	  applies	  to	  only	  women.	  In	  the	  third	  model,	  the	  healthcare	  variable	  only	  applies	  to	  men.	  This	  is	  to	  prevent	  multicollinearity	  in	  the	  model	  since	  healthcare	  within	  a	  household	  is	  highly	  correlated	  for	  both	  men	  and	  women.	  As	  for	  other	  supply-­‐side	  variables,	  the	  ASEC	  CPS	  does	  not	  include	  information	  on	  advanced	  reproductive	  technologies	  so	  those	  could	  not	  be	  included	  either.	  However	  I	  did	  include	  a	  health	  variable,	  which	  stratifies	  health	  into	  five	  different	  categories:	  excellent,	  very	  good,	  good,	  fair,	  and	  poor.	  Presumably,	  health	  could	  be	  a	  restrictive	  factor	  to	  fertility,	  thus	  limiting	  the	  supply	  for	  a	  desired	  child.	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  CHAPTER	  III	  RESULTS	  	  	   Table	  1	  presents	  the	  estimates	  for	  my	  three	  models	  using	  ASEC	  CPS	  2011	  -­‐2013	  data.	  These	  results	  illustrate	  which	  characteristics	  are	  indicative	  of	  people	  who	  delay	  childbirth.	  Since,	  raw	  probit	  data	  is	  difficult	  to	  interpret	  due	  to	  its	  nonlinear	  nature,	  a	  marginal	  effects	  post-­‐estimation	  is	  useful	  for	  providing	  a	  good	  linear	  approximation	  of	  the	  change	  in	  Y	  produced	  by	  one	  unit	  change	  in	  X.	  The	  estimates	  presented	  on	  table	  1	  are	  these	  final	  post-­‐estimation	  results.	  It	  is	  helpful	  to	  interpret	  the	  results	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  mean	  prediction.	  The	  mean	  prediction	  represents	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  average	  woman	  (man	  for	  model	  3)	  having	  a	  child	  in	  the	  last	  year.	  This	  probability	  is	  7.26%	  for	  model	  1,	  6.46%	  for	  model	  2,	  and	  5.06%	  for	  model	  3.	  In	  reality,	  this	  average	  woman	  cannot	  exist	  because	  they	  are	  the	  average	  of	  each	  variable	  in	  the	  model.	  This	  woman	  would	  have	  a	  total	  personal	  income	  of	  $23,407,	  be	  15.3%	  of	  a	  full-­‐time	  student,	  2.3%	  part-­‐time	  student,	  have	  40.4%	  of	  up	  to	  a	  high	  school	  education,	  but	  also	  31.2%	  of	  some	  college,	  19.8%	  of	  a	  college	  degree,	  7.8%	  of	  a	  masters	  or	  professional	  degree,	  and	  .88%	  of	  a	  doctoral	  degree,	  etc.	  Yet	  conceptually,	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  average	  woman	  makes	  the	  rest	  of	  it	  much	  easier	  to	  understand.	  For	  instance,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  probability	  of	  having	  a	  child	  in	  the	  last	  year	  for	  an	  average	  woman	  and	  a	  woman	  who	  is	  a	  full-­‐	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Table	  1:	  Model	  Results	  (ASEC	  CPS	  2011	  -­‐	  2013)	  
Variables dy/dx p.value dy/dx p.value dy/dx p.value
Women
Personal6income6last6year 6.56E.08 0.517 1.91E.09 0.983
Student6(full) .0.0552 0 .0.0494 0
Student6(part) .0.0285 0 .0.0227 0
Some6college 0.0039 0.131 0.0053 0.012
College6graduate 0.0019 0.559 0.0059 0.022
Masters/professional 0.0103 0.028 0.0147 0
Doctorate 0.0257 0.034 0.0324 0
Employed6last6year6(full) .0.0224 0.002 .0.0133 0.015
Employed6last6year6(part) .0.0129 0.103 .0.0055 0.344
One6parent6foreign6born 0.0003 0.96 0.0011 0.796
Both6parents6foreign6born 0.0070 0.165 0.0021 0.566
Health6(excellent) 0.0215 0.011 0.0235 0
Health6(very6good) 0.0201 0.011 0.0219 0
Health6(good) 0.0139 0.079 0.0177 0.002
Health6(fair) 0.0030 0.736 0.0102 0.105
Age .0.0041 0 .0.0037 0
Men
Personal6income6last6year .2.11E.08 0.687 1.17E.07 0.015
Student6(full) .0.0332 0 .0.0301 0
Student6(part) .0.0175 0.048 .0.0079 0.218
Some6college 0.0029 0.237 0.0055 0.004
College6graduate 0.0030 0.358 0.0073 0.001
Masters/professional 0.0092 0.041 0.0162 0
Doctorate 0.0087 0.41 0.0102 0.121
Employed6last6year6(full) 0.0043 0.269 0.0046 0.359
Employed6last6year6(part) 0.0051 0.333 .0.0007 0.895
One6parent6foreign6born 0.0004 0.949 .0.0068 0.062
Both6parents6foreign6born .0.0038 0.402 .0.0056 0.061
Health6(excellent) 0.0050 0.531 0.0066 0.356
Health6(very6good) 0.0005 0.948 0.0025 0.719
Health6(good) .0.0011 0.89 0.0012 0.868
Health6(fair) 0.0043 0.59 0.0028 0.721
Age .0.0006 0 .0.0024 0
General
Household6income6last6year .1.3E.07 0 .1.2E.07 0 .1.4E.07 0
Married 0.0645 0 0.0674 0 0.0896 0
Cohabitating 0.0287 0 0.0372 0 0.0603 0
Homeowner .0.0072 0.004 .0.0062 0.001 .0.0012 0.503
Public6housing 0.0363 0 0.0374 0 0.0323 0
Any6health6coverage 0.0168 0 0.0142 0 0.0027 0.147
Living6w/6parents .0.0338 0 .0.0372 0 .0.0194 0
#6of6additional6children 0.0001 0.931 0.0023 0 0.0016 0
Mean6Prediction 0.0726 0 0.0646 0 0.0506 0
Model61 Model62 Model63
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Household&income&last&year 78.9% 79.3% 713.8%
Married 88.8% 104.3% 177.2%
Cohabitating 39.5% 57.6% 119.3%
Homeowner 79.9% 79.5% 7
Public&housing 50.0% 57.9% 63.9%
Any&health&coverage 23.2% 21.9% 7
Living&w/&parents 746.5% 757.5% 738.3%
#&of&additional&children 7 3.6% 3.1%
Mean&Prediction 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Percent&Δ&from&mean&prediction
	  Notes:	  Statistically	  insignificant	  variables	  at	  the	  .05	  level	  are	  null	  in	  this	  table.	  Also,	  income	  values	  assume	  an	  income	  of	  $50,000.	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time	  student,	  holding	  all	  else	  equal,	  is	  about	  -­‐5.5%.	  	  This	  means	  that	  a	  woman	  who	  is	  currently	  going	  to	  school	  full-­‐time	  had	  only	  a	  1.8%	  chance	  of	  having	  a	  child	  in	  the	  last	  year.	  Now,	  this	  assumes	  that	  the	  single	  difference	  between	  the	  average	  woman	  and	  the	  full-­‐time	  student	  is	  the	  student	  status.	  However,	  according	  to	  model	  1,	  that	  one	  change	  decreases	  the	  probability	  of	  having	  a	  child	  in	  the	  last	  year	  by	  75.9%	  compared	  to	  the	  average	  woman.	  Table	  2	  displays	  the	  percent	  change	  compared	  to	  the	  average	  person	  for	  every	  statistically	  significant	  variable.	  	  	   	   Income	  and	  Employment	  The	  resource	  paradox	  is	  the	  title	  given	  to	  the	  concept	  that	  families	  with	  more	  resources	  end	  up	  having	  fewer	  children.	  However	  my	  findings	  do	  not	  necessarily	  support	  this	  theory.	  Including	  public	  housing	  as	  a	  variable	  in	  the	  model	  changes	  the	  relationship	  between	  income	  and	  childbearing.	  It	  seems	  that	  whether	  someone	  is	  on	  government	  assistance	  matters	  much	  more	  than	  either	  personal	  or	  household	  income.	  Living	  in	  public	  housing	  increases	  the	  chance	  of	  having	  a	  child	  last	  year	  by	  over	  50%	  (all	  three	  models).	  Accounting	  for	  women’s	  employment	  status,	  the	  results	  show	  that	  total	  personal	  income	  for	  women	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant	  for	  either	  the	  first	  or	  second	  model.	  Income	  did	  not	  impact	  recent	  fertility.	  Women’s	  full-­‐time	  employment	  did	  have	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  recent	  fertility.	  This	  effect	  was	  nearly	  31%	  for	  the	  first	  model	  and	  21%	  for	  the	  second.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  working	  part-­‐time	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  This	  suggests	  that,	  in	  terms	  of	  time	  and	  money,	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  working	  only	  part-­‐time	  was	  not	  high	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enough	  to	  discourage	  childbearing	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  full-­‐time	  employment	  discourages	  childbearing.	  In	  the	  first	  model,	  men’s	  total	  personal	  income	  and	  employment	  status	  did	  not	  impact	  recent	  fertility.	  However,	  as	  mentioned	  before,	  this	  model	  does	  not	  represent	  every	  male	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  15	  and	  44	  years—the	  third	  model	  does.	  And	  in	  the	  third	  model,	  men’s	  total	  personal	  income	  was	  statistically	  significant.	  Assuming	  an	  income	  of	  $50,000,	  personal	  income	  actually	  increased	  the	  probability	  of	  his	  partner	  having	  a	  child	  in	  the	  last	  year	  by	  nearly	  12%.	  Oddly	  enough,	  employment	  status	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant	  for	  men	  in	  the	  third	  model.	  This	  might	  suggest	  that,	  in	  terms	  of	  influencing	  recent	  fertility,	  employment	  status	  is	  less	  important	  than	  how	  much	  money	  they	  make;	  yet	  usually	  a	  person	  has	  to	  be	  employed	  to	  make	  money.	  This	  is	  in	  complete	  contrast	  to	  the	  resource	  paradox	  stating	  that	  families	  with	  more	  resources	  have	  fewer	  children.	  All	  things	  considered,	  there	  is	  likely	  a	  positive	  overall	  effect	  on	  recent	  fertility	  from	  male	  employment	  and	  personal	  income.	  Either	  way,	  public	  housing	  has	  a	  much	  larger	  impact	  on	  recent	  fertility	  than	  total	  personal	  income.	  	  The	  results	  are	  also	  not	  clear	  when	  considering	  household	  income.	  Again,	  assuming	  an	  income	  of	  $50,000,	  household	  income	  decreased	  the	  probability	  of	  having	  a	  child	  in	  the	  last	  year	  by	  only	  about	  9%	  (model	  1	  &	  2),	  and	  14%	  (model	  3).	  These	  were	  all	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  however	  their	  impact	  on	  recent	  fertility	  was	  much	  smaller	  compared	  to	  public	  housing.	  Additionally,	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  data	  section,	  to	  prevent	  multicollinearity,	  total	  personal	  income	  for	  women	  and/or	  men	  (depending	  on	  the	  model)	  was	  subtracted	  from	  household	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income.	  Therefore,	  household	  income	  represents	  other’s	  total	  income	  living	  in	  the	  same	  household.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  household	  income	  might	  not	  capture	  a	  monetary	  relationship	  with	  fertility.	  Rather,	  this	  variable	  may	  point	  to	  a	  relationship	  between	  childbearing	  and	  living	  with	  roommates	  or	  adult	  offspring.	  	  Therefore,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  there	  might	  not	  be	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  income	  and	  childbearing	  as	  previously	  theorized.	  This	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  results	  of	  Klawon	  and	  Tiefenthaler	  (2001)	  that	  found	  in	  Brazil,	  both	  men	  and	  women	  chose	  to	  invest	  more	  in	  fewer	  children	  as	  income	  increases.	  It	  appears	  that	  people	  in	  the	  United	  States	  on	  welfare	  make	  up	  a	  disproportionately	  high	  percentage	  of	  childbearing,	  which	  probably	  accounts	  for	  the	  apparent	  relationship	  between	  income	  and	  decreased	  fertility.	  This	  outcome	  is	  not	  completely	  unique;	  Westoff	  and	  Marshall	  (2010)	  also	  found	  a	  strong	  association	  between	  poverty	  and	  fertility.	  Additionally,	  data	  from	  Martinez	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  suggest	  that	  women	  near	  poverty	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  premarital	  first	  births	  and	  more	  children.	  The	  report	  states	  that,	  women	  with	  household	  incomes	  less	  than	  150%	  of	  the	  poverty	  level	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  four	  or	  more	  children	  than	  those	  with	  higher	  incomes.	  Also,	  64%	  of	  these	  women	  had	  a	  premarital	  first	  birth,	  compared	  with	  21%	  of	  those	  currently	  living	  at	  300%	  of	  the	  poverty	  level	  or	  higher.	  This	  information	  would	  suggest	  that	  at	  a	  certain	  income	  level	  there	  is	  either	  a	  cultural	  break	  or	  a	  distinct	  incentive	  structure	  that	  causes	  differing	  preferences	  for	  children.	  	   Educational	  Attainment	  and	  Enrollment	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As	  documented	  by	  other	  research,	  my	  results	  support	  the	  theory	  that	  more	  education	  decreases	  fertility,	  however	  only	  insofar	  that	  educational	  enrollment	  delays	  fertility.	  Aside	  from	  age	  and	  being	  married,	  being	  enrolled	  as	  a	  full-­‐time	  student	  exerted	  the	  most	  significant	  impact	  on	  recent	  birth	  for	  women.	  As	  stated	  before,	  all	  else	  equal,	  a	  woman	  enrolled	  as	  a	  full-­‐time	  student	  is	  about	  76%	  (model	  1	  &	  2)	  less	  likely	  than	  the	  average	  woman	  to	  have	  had	  a	  child	  and	  last	  year.	  This	  effect	  is	  still	  quite	  strong	  for	  female	  part-­‐time	  students.	  Women	  were	  nearly	  40%	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  child	  in	  the	  last	  year	  for	  the	  first	  model	  and	  35%	  less	  likely	  in	  the	  second	  model.	  These	  results	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  findings	  from	  Ní	  Bhrolcháin	  and	  Beaujouan	  (2012),	  Dey	  and	  Wasoff	  (2010),	  and	  Romeu	  Gordo	  (2009),	  that	  women’s	  fertility	  timing	  is	  determined	  more	  by	  their	  extended	  participation	  in	  schooling	  and	  less	  by	  their	  level	  of	  education.	  Interestingly,	  not	  a	  single	  educational	  attainment	  variable	  in	  my	  models	  had	  a	  negative	  correlation	  with	  the	  dependent	  variable:	  recent	  birth.	  Rather,	  they	  had	  positive	  correlations.	  This	  does	  not	  reflect	  that	  they	  had	  more	  children,	  but	  rather	  once	  they	  finish	  their	  educational	  enrollment	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  start	  having	  children.	  The	  effects	  of	  educational	  attainment	  were	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  educational	  enrollment	  but	  most	  were	  statistically	  significant.	  There	  is	  likely	  a	  compensation	  for	  greater	  fertility	  once	  more	  resources	  become	  available	  after	  finishing	  school	  as	  suggested	  by	  Martin	  (2000).	  	  The	  results	  of	  this	  study	  show	  that	  men’s	  enrollment	  does	  affect	  fertility.	  Holding	  all	  else	  equal,	  being	  a	  male	  full-­‐time	  student	  decreased	  the	  probability	  of	  female	  fertility	  in	  the	  last	  year	  by	  46%	  (model	  1).	  In	  the	  third	  model	  this	  effect	  was	  more	  significant	  and	  decreased	  the	  probability	  of	  having	  a	  recent	  birth	  by	  nearly	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60%.	  In	  both	  models	  the	  results	  were	  statistically	  significant	  for	  full-­‐time	  students.	  For	  part-­‐time	  students	  however	  the	  statistical	  significance	  was	  less	  clear.	  In	  the	  first	  model,	  male	  part	  time	  students	  were	  nearly	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  however	  in	  the	  third	  model	  the	  statistical	  significance	  was	  not	  nearly	  as	  close.	  As	  for	  men’s	  educational	  attainment,	  in	  the	  first	  model	  only	  one	  level	  of	  educational	  attainment	  was	  statistically	  significant:	  masters	  or	  professional	  degree.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  couples	  wait	  until	  certain	  educational	  levels	  are	  achieved	  for	  either	  male	  or	  female.	  At	  some	  level	  this	  makes	  sense;	  it	  is	  usually	  after	  a	  masters	  or	  professional	  degree	  that	  individuals	  can	  get	  significantly	  better	  paying	  job.	  They	  should	  also	  theoretically	  have	  more	  time	  to	  care	  for	  children.	  In	  the	  third	  model,	  more	  levels	  of	  educational	  attainment	  were	  statistically	  significant	  and	  support	  this	  idea.	  	   	   Foreign-­‐Born	  Parents	  and	  Living	  with	  Parents	  There	  used	  to	  be	  an	  idea	  that	  foreigners	  come	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  have	  large	  families;	  however	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case.	  Westoff,	  &	  Marshall	  (2010)	  find	  that	  being	  foreign-­‐born	  is	  now	  irrelevant,	  and	  my	  results	  concur.	  	  I	  looked	  for	  any	  cultural	  influence	  on	  fertility	  preference	  by	  examining	  individuals	  with	  one	  or	  both	  parents	  being	  foreign-­‐born.	  None	  of	  these	  variables	  were	  statistically	  significant	  in	  any	  model	  at	  the	  .05	  level.	  However	  at	  the	  .10	  level,	  men	  in	  the	  third	  model	  with	  foreign-­‐born	  parents	  were	  actually	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  child	  last	  year	  and	  not	  more.	  This	  could	  reflect	  a	  second-­‐order	  effect	  of	  remittance,	  the	  common	  practice	  among	  foreign	  workers	  to	  send	  money	  to	  their	  family	  still	  living	  in	  their	  homeland.	  These	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individuals	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  childbearing	  activities	  since	  they	  have	  possibly	  already	  committed	  to	  a	  wife	  and	  children	  back	  home.	  The	  results	  would	  suggest	  that	  in	  the	  aggregate,	  any	  culturally	  based	  fertility	  preferences	  disappear	  once	  individuals	  either	  move	  to	  or	  grow	  up	  in	  America.	  	  	   As	  for	  women	  and	  men	  living	  with	  their	  parents	  into	  adulthood,	  this	  factor	  significantly	  decreases	  the	  probability	  of	  having	  a	  child	  in	  the	  last	  year.	  One	  thing	  to	  note	  however	  is	  that	  this	  variable	  could	  be	  correlated	  with	  student	  and	  age	  as	  the	  likelihood	  of	  individuals	  living	  with	  their	  parents	  is	  higher	  for	  young	  adult	  students.	  	  That	  being	  said	  all	  of	  these	  variables	  have	  a	  negative	  coefficient,	  therefore	  excluding	  this	  variable	  would	  only	  make	  those	  correlated	  variables	  more	  negative.	  In	  the	  first	  model,	  living	  with	  either	  the	  male	  or	  female’s	  parents	  decreased	  the	  chance	  of	  having	  a	  child	  in	  last	  year	  by	  about	  47%	  holding	  all	  else	  equal.	  Likewise,	  the	  probability	  of	  recent	  fertility	  decreased	  by	  58%	  in	  the	  second	  model	  and	  38%	  in	  the	  third	  model.	  Clearly,	  living	  with	  parents	  into	  adulthood	  hampers	  the	  ability	  of	  both	  men	  and	  women	  to	  start	  a	  family	  of	  their	  own.	  	   Health	  and	  Health	  Coverage	  	   Interestingly,	  this	  is	  certainly	  one	  area	  in	  which	  men	  do	  not	  matter.	  The	  health	  status	  for	  women	  was	  often	  statistically	  significant	  for	  greater	  childbearing	  at	  the	  .05	  level.	  The	  probability	  of	  having	  a	  child	  also	  increased	  as	  their	  quality	  of	  health	  increased.	  This	  was	  not	  the	  case	  with	  men.	  Not	  a	  single	  stratified	  health	  variable	  was	  statistically	  significant	  for	  men.	  This	  may	  indicate	  that	  men	  are	  less	  in	  tune	  with	  their	  health,	  or	  that	  men’s	  health	  is	  really	  not	  a	  concern	  for	  fertility.	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Assuming	  that	  is,	  the	  man	  does	  not	  have	  a	  disease	  or	  condition	  preventing	  them	  from	  having	  children.	  When	  we	  look	  at	  health	  coverage,	  men	  are	  also	  not	  statically	  significant.	  It	  appears	  that	  health	  coverage	  only	  impacts	  the	  chance	  of	  a	  recent	  birth	  when	  women	  have	  it.	  Holding	  all	  else	  equal,	  women	  who	  have	  health	  coverage	  were	  about	  22%	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  child	  in	  the	  last	  year.	  	  	   Family	  Formation	  and	  Additional	  Children	  	   Family	  formation	  and	  additional	  children	  were	  important	  variables	  in	  the	  models.	  There	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  being	  married	  is	  the	  single	  most	  important	  contributing	  factor	  to	  having	  a	  child	  last	  year.	  Marriage	  was	  associated	  with	  an	  increased	  probability	  of	  childbearing	  by	  89%	  for	  the	  first	  model,	  104%	  for	  the	  second	  model,	  and	  177%	  for	  the	  third	  model;	  all	  were	  statistically	  significant.	  While	  the	  coefficient	  was	  not	  much	  different	  for	  the	  third	  model,	  the	  percentage	  was	  much	  higher	  because	  the	  mean	  prediction	  was	  much	  lower.	  Additionally,	  the	  high	  percentage	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  unobservable	  births	  these	  men	  have	  with	  women	  they	  do	  not	  live	  with.	  Cohabitation	  likewise	  had	  significant	  effects	  on	  childbearing	  in	  the	  last	  year.	  Cohabitation	  increased	  the	  probability	  of	  childbearing	  by	  40%	  for	  the	  first	  model,	  58%	  for	  the	  second	  model,	  and	  119%	  for	  the	  third	  model.	  While	  cohabitation	  is	  currently	  lower	  than	  marital	  childbearing,	  over	  the	  years	  I	  might	  expect	  these	  numbers	  to	  converge	  more	  as	  society	  becomes	  more	  accepting	  of	  alternative	  family	  formations.	  Additional	  children	  also	  affected	  childbearing	  in	  the	  second	  and	  third	  model.	  In	  the	  first	  model	  there	  was	  almost	  no	  statistical	  significance.	  However	  in	  the	  second	  and	  third	  model	  there	  was,	  surprisingly,	  a	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positive	  correlation	  between	  the	  number	  of	  additional	  children	  currently	  present	  in	  the	  family	  and	  having	  a	  child	  and	  last	  year.	  The	  effect	  was	  small,	  only	  affecting	  recent	  childbearing	  by	  about	  3.5%	  for	  each	  additional	  child,	  however	  this	  results	  alludes	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  for	  some	  families	  there	  is	  not	  a	  diminishing	  marginal	  return	  for	  children.	  If	  so,	  this	  result	  supports	  the	  idea	  there	  could	  be	  a	  cultural	  break	  or	  a	  distinct	  incentive	  structure	  between	  two	  different	  groups	  of	  Americans.	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  CHAPTER	  IV	  DISCUSSION	  	  To	  answer	  the	  question	  posed	  in	  the	  title,	  “Do	  men	  matter?”	  the	  answer	  is	  most	  certainly	  yes.	  There	  is	  definitely	  a	  relationship	  between	  circumstances	  that	  affect	  the	  male	  and	  delays	  to	  female	  fertility.	  Individuals	  go	  through	  various	  life	  stages,	  and	  men	  just	  like	  women,	  seem	  to	  prefer	  completing	  school	  before	  having	  children.	  Men	  may	  either	  convince	  their	  partner	  to	  wait	  until	  after	  they	  have	  completed	  school	  or	  wait	  until	  they	  complete	  school	  before	  they	  look	  for	  their	  partner.	  Regardless,	  being	  a	  male	  full-­‐time	  student	  will	  delay	  fertility.	  And	  since	  qualification	  inflation	  pressures	  both	  men	  and	  women	  to	  stay	  in	  school	  longer	  to	  become	  competitive	  in	  the	  workplace,	  we	  should	  expect	  the	  trend	  of	  delayed	  fertility	  to	  continue	  into	  the	  near	  future.	  Settling	  into	  a	  good	  career	  is	  important	  for	  men	  to	  accomplish	  before	  childbearing.	  While	  male	  employment	  status	  did	  not	  impact	  recent	  fertility,	  it	  appears	  that	  men	  who	  make	  more	  money	  are	  also	  more	  successful	  in	  the	  fertility	  market.	  These	  results	  are	  not	  terribly	  surprising	  however	  they	  do	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  male	  fertility	  theory.	  It	  is	  no	  longer	  appropriate	  to	  use	  the	  variable	  “married”	  as	  a	  catchall	  for	  the	  assumed	  constant	  fertility	  behavior	  of	  men.	  Men’s	  fertility	  behavior	  is	  not	  constant.	  And	  while	  women’s	  circumstances	  remain	  a	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much	  stronger	  force	  on	  fertility,	  men’s	  circumstances	  also	  significantly	  affect	  fertility.	  	   The	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  The	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  will	  likely	  change	  some	  of	  the	  fertility	  patterns	  in	  United	  States.	  My	  findings	  suggest	  that	  as	  more	  women	  acquire	  healthcare	  and	  are	  able	  to	  afford	  pregnancy	  costs,	  more	  women	  may	  elect	  to	  have	  children.	  Therefore	  we	  could	  actually	  see	  an	  increase	  in	  fertility.	  This	  result	  would	  be	  especially	  important	  for	  insurance	  companies	  as	  their	  pregnancy	  related	  payouts	  are	  sure	  to	  increase	  unless	  hospitals	  utilize	  cost	  saving	  measures.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  contraceptive	  use	  will	  likely	  increase	  and	  thereby	  depress	  the	  current	  fertility	  rate.	  Currently,	  approximately	  62%	  of	  women	  of	  reproductive	  age	  use	  some	  form	  of	  contraception	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Jones,	  Mosher,	  &	  Daniels,	  2012).	  This	  percentage	  will	  likely	  increase	  by	  some	  measure	  as	  more	  women	  have	  affordable	  access	  to	  contraception.	  I	  would	  expect	  these	  two	  forces	  to	  jointly	  decrease	  the	  percentage	  of	  unintended	  births.	  Since	  these	  unintended	  births	  are	  disproportionately	  from	  unmarried	  women,	  black	  women,	  and	  women	  with	  less	  education	  or	  income	  (Mosher	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  these	  two	  forces	  will	  likely	  act	  against	  different	  demographic	  groups	  in	  the	  population.	  Overall,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  fertility	  rate	  will	  increase	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act.	  	   A	  Possible	  Cultural	  Break	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In	  terms	  of	  fertility	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  two	  major	  cultures	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  One	  culture	  is	  dominated	  by	  more	  highly	  educated	  dual-­‐earner/dual-­‐caregiver	  family	  formations	  who	  commonly	  opt	  for	  the	  two-­‐child	  norm,	  and	  the	  other	  is	  dominated	  by	  less	  educated	  single	  mothers	  raising	  four	  or	  more	  children.	  In	  fact,	  nearly	  one	  in	  four	  women	  with	  less	  than	  a	  high	  school	  diploma	  had	  four	  or	  more	  children,	  more	  than	  twice	  the	  percentage	  for	  any	  other	  education	  group	  (Martinez	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  many	  of	  these	  women	  did	  not	  complete	  high	  school	  in	  part	  due	  to	  early	  sexual	  activity.	  Even	  delaying	  intercourse	  by	  one	  year	  can	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  women	  graduating	  from	  high	  school	  (Sabia	  &	  Rees,	  2009).	  Additionally,	  parental	  living	  arrangements	  at	  age	  14	  are	  associated	  with	  an	  increased	  likelihood	  of	  having	  a	  premarital	  first	  birth	  for	  both	  men	  and	  women.	  Among	  men	  and	  women	  living	  with	  both	  parents	  at	  age	  14,	  35%	  and	  20%	  had	  a	  premarital	  first	  birth	  respectively,	  compared	  to	  55%	  and	  34%	  of	  men	  and	  women	  who	  experienced	  other	  types	  of	  living	  arrangements	  (Martinez	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  These	  statistics	  may	  suggest	  a	  perpetual	  cycle	  in	  which	  disadvantaged	  youths	  have	  extreme	  difficulty	  in	  breaking	  out	  of	  poverty.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  educational	  and	  resource	  gap	  between	  these	  two	  cultures.	  Parents	  outside	  of	  welfare/poverty	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  fewer	  children,	  and	  parents	  with	  fewer	  children	  are	  able	  to	  concentrate	  their	  resources	  (e.g.	  time,	  advice,	  money,	  etc.)	  into	  each	  child.	  Consequently,	  the	  destinies	  of	  higher	  and	  lower	  socio-­‐	  economic	  status	  children	  are	  diverging	  (Bailey,	  Guldi,	  &	  Hershbein,	  2013).	  This	  divergence	  will	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decrease	  the	  relative	  opportunities	  available	  to	  disadvantaged	  children	  and	  widen	  the	  inequality	  in	  the	  labor	  markets.	  	  	   	   Consequences	  of	  Low	  Fertility	  While	  there	  has	  been	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  Total	  Fertilty	  Rate7	  (TFR)	  across	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  developed	  world	  in	  recent	  years,	  it	  does	  not	  suggest	  an	  end	  to	  the	  sub-­‐replacement	  fertility	  experienced	  in	  most	  of	  the	  developed	  world	  	  (Goldstein,	  Sobotka,	  &	  Jasilioniene,	  2009).	  The	  decision	  to	  have	  children	  is	  a	  personal	  family	  matter,	  however	  there	  are	  far	  reaching	  national	  implications	  as	  many	  families	  adopt	  similar	  plans.	  Household	  decisions	  about	  fertility	  influence	  demand	  for	  goods,	  production	  of	  household	  goods,	  and	  the	  supply	  of	  labor	  to	  the	  market;	  future	  generations	  of	  workers	  and	  consumers	  are	  also	  affected	  by	  current	  fertility	  preferences	  (Klawon	  &	  Tiefenthaler,	  2001).	  Therefore,	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  country	  is	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  the	  growth	  and	  decline	  of	  the	  population.	  A	  low	  birth	  rate	  and	  an	  aging	  population	  will	  decrease	  the	  size	  of	  the	  working	  population	  and	  increase	  the	  dependency	  ratio8	  (Keng	  &	  Sheu,	  2011).	  Advancements	  in	  medical	  technology	  extend	  the	  life	  of	  the	  elderly	  and	  accentuate	  this	  issue.	  In	  many	  countries,	  apprehensions	  grow	  as	  declining	  populations	  and	  aging	  population	  profiles	  pose	  serious	  implications	  for	  labor	  market	  supply,	  pensions,	  and	  expenditure	  on	  health	  and	  welfare	  services	  (Dey	  &	  Wasoff,	  2010).	  The	  result	  could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  Total	  Fertility	  Rate	  or	  TFR	  is	  commonly	  described	  as	  the	  average	  total	  fertility	  per	  woman	  over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  lifetime.	  A	  TFR	  of	  2.1	  is	  considered	  at	  replacement	  while	  anything	  above	  or	  below	  that	  number	  is	  considered	  above	  replacement	  or	  below	  replacement	  respectively.	  	  8	  The	  dependency	  ratio	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  individuals	  of	  non-­‐working	  ages	  by	  working	  ages.	  Generally,	  the	  working	  age	  is	  considered	  between	  15	  and	  64.	  This	  ratio	  increases	  as	  the	  population	  becomes	  more	  elderly	  or	  has	  an	  unusually	  large	  young	  generation.	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undermine	  the	  living	  standards	  of	  future	  generations.	  As	  such,	  low	  fertility	  has	  increasingly	  become	  a	  matter	  of	  policy	  concern	  for	  the	  governments	  of	  many	  developed	  countries	  (Lutz	  &	  Skirbekk,	  2005;	  Goldstein,	  Sobotka,	  &	  Jasilioniene,	  2009).	  However,	  policies	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  fertility	  and/or	  increasing	  immigration	  should	  help	  moderate	  and	  soften	  the	  expected	  negative	  consequences	  of	  population	  aging	  (Lutz	  &	  Skirbekk,	  2005).	  	  	   Influencing	  National	  Fertility	  There	  are	  certain	  policy	  measures	  that	  if	  implemented	  in	  the	  United	  States	  could	  either	  increase	  or	  decrease	  fertility.	  Demographers	  consider	  postponement	  as	  a	  major	  reason	  for	  current	  low	  fertility	  (Morgan,	  2003).	  Therefore,	  decreasing	  delayed	  fertility	  is	  key	  to	  increasing	  fertility.	  My	  analysis	  identifies	  the	  most	  potent	  contributors	  to	  delayed	  fertility	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  These	  include	  student	  enrollment,	  female	  employment,	  male	  unemployment,	  lack	  of	  health	  coverage,	  living	  with	  parents,	  and	  declining	  marital	  rates.	  Many	  of	  these	  contributors	  should	  be	  approached	  indirectly—taking	  special	  consideration	  of	  their	  underlying	  causes.	  For	  instance,	  we	  should	  not	  create	  policies	  to	  decrease	  female	  employment.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  2,	  depending	  on	  women’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  labor	  force,	  policies	  aimed	  at	  stimulating	  fertility	  by	  reducing	  employment	  are	  ineffective	  (Maxwell,	  1998).	  Rather,	  we	  should	  create	  policies	  to	  further	  aid	  women’s	  ability	  to	  combine	  work	  with	  family	  formation.	  While	  rising	  birth	  rates	  for	  college	  educated	  women	  after	  age	  30	  could	  reflect	  an	  increased	  ability	  to	  use	  their	  incomes	  and	  human	  capital	  to	  facilitate	  childbearing	  and	  child	  rearing,	  almost	  half	  remain	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childless	  by	  choice	  or	  necessity	  (Martin,	  2000).	  Policies	  that	  encourage	  a	  more	  family-­‐friendly	  employment	  environment	  could	  encourage	  greater	  fertility	  (Hakim,	  2003).	  If	  done	  correctly,	  these	  policies	  would	  allow	  more	  women	  have	  children	  while	  still	  participating	  as	  valuable	  members	  of	  the	  labor	  force.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  contributors	  for	  delayed	  fertility	  are	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  associated	  with	  the	  inability	  to	  get	  early	  access	  to	  resources.	  As	  women	  age,	  they	  face	  a	  set	  of	  competing	  demands	  that	  are	  most	  easily	  accommodated	  by	  a	  delay	  in	  fertility	  (Morgan,	  2003).	  As	  supported	  by	  my	  research,	  these	  competing	  demands,	  while	  occasionally	  different	  in	  nature,	  also	  delay	  male	  fertility.	  Early	  on,	  many	  of	  these	  demands	  are	  for	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  acquiring	  a	  decent	  job.	  Qualification	  inflation	  extends	  educational	  enrollment,	  and	  men	  and	  women	  tend	  to	  consolidate	  their	  careers	  before	  childbearing.	  Before	  this	  consolidation,	  many	  individuals	  lack	  stability	  for	  or	  cannot	  afford	  childbearing.	  After	  all,	  declining	  fertility	  has	  often	  been	  attributed	  to	  the	  rising	  direct	  and	  indirect	  costs	  of	  child-­‐rearing	  (Dey	  &	  Wasoff,	  2010).	  Therefore,	  many	  researchers	  favor	  policy	  measures	  focused	  on	  reformation	  of	  the	  educational	  system	  (Dey	  &	  Wasoff,	  2010;	  Lutz	  &	  Skirbekk,	  2005;	  Ní	  Bhrolcháin	  &	  Beaujouan,	  2012).	  The	  goal	  of	  educational	  reforms	  would	  be	  to	  create	  a	  more	  efficient	  school	  system	  with	  a	  younger	  average	  age	  of	  completion.	  This	  would	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  decreasing	  educational	  standards.	  By	  increasing	  educational	  specialization	  targeted	  towards	  increased	  market	  need,	  educational	  reform	  could	  create	  a	  younger,	  more	  highly	  skilled	  labor	  force.	  This	  should	  in	  theory,	  reduce	  early	  barriers	  to	  entry	  for	  childbearing	  and	  increase	  fertility	  rates.	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Such	  reforms	  would	  also	  serve	  to	  reduce	  the	  social	  cost	  of	  education	  (Lutz	  &	  Skirbekk,	  2005).	  	   Conclusion	  	   Fertility	  research	  has	  traditionally	  overlooked	  much	  of	  the	  male	  counterpart	  due	  to	  data	  restrictions	  and	  the	  assumption	  that	  male	  fertility	  behavior	  is	  constant.	  However	  using	  improved	  CPS	  data,	  this	  paper	  shows	  that	  this	  assumption	  is	  invalid.	  	  Just	  as	  for	  women,	  men	  prefer	  to	  have	  children	  at	  certain	  life	  stages	  and	  will	  delay	  childbearing	  to	  maximize	  their	  own	  utility	  function.	  This	  paper	  also	  examines	  existing	  theories	  on	  delayed	  fertility	  by	  comparing	  the	  results	  from	  three	  different	  models.	  Common	  characteristics	  of	  individuals	  who	  delay	  childbearing	  include	  student	  enrollment,	  being	  neither	  married	  nor	  cohabitating,	  the	  lack	  of	  health	  coverage,	  and	  living	  with	  parents.	  Women	  were	  also	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  child	  in	  the	  last	  year	  if	  they	  were	  employed	  or	  had	  relatively	  poor	  health.	  Comparatively,	  men’s	  recent	  fertility	  increased	  when	  they	  were	  employed;	  health	  had	  no	  impact	  on	  fertility	  in	  the	  last	  year.	  Qualification	  inflation	  and	  difficult	  economic	  conditions	  exasperate	  delays	  to	  fertility.	  Additionally,	  the	  rise	  of	  dual-­‐earner/dual-­‐caregiver	  and	  non-­‐marital	  family	  formations	  diversify	  the	  modern	  face	  of	  fertility.	  As	  such,	  policy	  measures	  that	  help	  society	  adapt	  to	  these	  trends	  are	  important	  for	  continued	  near-­‐replacement	  level	  fertility	  in	  United	  States.	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